Feminists and their Stereotypes

Marlo Thomas, posting over at Huffington about "Guys Who Get it", clearly doesn't get it herself.

Here's a riddle:

A trucker is sitting in a bar next to a feminist. They've both had a lot to drink and they're arguing. The feminist says women have been oppressed for centuries -- the trucker says they haven't. The feminist says women deserve equal pay -- the trucker says they don't. The feminist says a woman should be president -- the trucker just laughs. They simply don't see eye to eye.

What's the one thing the trucker and the feminist have in common?

They're both men.

Um, no, neither "person" in that riddle is a man, Marlo. They are both stereotypes out of the eighties and seventies, respectively, and boring stereotypes at that. Here's a more realistic version, one that also has the advantage of being arguably funny:

A feminist and a trawler captain are in a bar, and the feminist has had too much to drink. The feminist is getting loud, trying to impress the captain, and says, "Women have been oppressed for centuries!"

The captain looks at him, obviously annoyed by the posturing, and scowls.

"Ain't now."

"I believe in equal pay for equal work!" proclaims the feminist.

The captain, thinking about the hardy crew of the trawler, looks the feminist up and down, lingering only briefly on the feminist's untoned arms.

The captain shrugs. "You'd starve."

Oblivious, the feminist continues his conversation with himself. "I think a woman should be president."

The trawler captain picks up her mug, drains it, and sets it back down, gets up and saunters toward the door. At the last moment before the captain hits the door, she gives the feminist an impish grin over her shoulder.

"I like Palin, too."

Capital Punishment for Educational Conglomerates

Forbes reported in January that a major for-profit educational conglomerate called ATI Enterprises was quietly liquidating itself rather than commit sepukku in bankruptcy court:

ATI, based in Texas, started as a small operation 50 years ago that eventually turned into a major money maker for the entrepreneurs that grew it to as many as 23 schools across five states, including seven in Texas. Despite the money and brainpower put into the school, in November the company decided to close all its schools under the ATI brand following a devastating two-year litany of bad press and regulatory scrutiny.

Why not declare Chapter 11 reorganization? There's a little problem of eligibility for federal student loans under 20 USC 1094:

1094(a) Required for programs of assistance; contents

The agreement shall condition the initial and continuing eligibility of an institution to participate in a program upon compliance with the following requirements:

...

(3) The institution will establish and maintain such administrative and fiscal procedures and records as may be necessary to ensure proper and efficient administration of funds received from the Secretary or from students

(4) The institution will comply with the provisions of subsection (c) of this section and the regulations prescribed under that subsection, relating to fiscal eligibility.

So the lenders are out of luck, because if ATI declares bankruptcy like a normal business, its major source of funding its sales dries up. Of course, if the government notices that ATI's liquidating assets, that would likely incur the same capital punishment, unless it has sufficient internal controls to wall off the unit's it's still operating.

So, why all the scrutiny that brought down ATI's other units? A 2012 Senate report had this to say:

A 2-year investigation by the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions demonstrated that Federal taxpayers are investing billions of dollars a year, $32 billion in the most recent year, in companies that operate for-profit colleges. Yet, more than half of the students who enrolled in in [sic] those colleges in 2008-9 left without a degree or diploma within a median of 4 months.

Okay, but you can't earn a real diploma in 4 months full time. How much of that $32 billion was for other half of the students - the ones who didn't wash out in the first 120 days? If $30 billion is for the ones who worked their way through it, and $2 billion for the washouts, then it might be money well spent. On the other hand, if it's $18B and $14B, then clearly the government needs to recalibrate the rules to pay for performance. Considering that the default rate from all for-profit students (see appendix 16-17 of the Senate report) is around 17-19%, that suggests that about $6B out of the $32B is at risk.

I haven't finished perusing the appendixes to see what the equivalent numbers are for public institutions. I would expect that there are subdivisions of most public institutions that have a worse record for student payback, but I'm sure public institutions hide that by reporting the university as a whole or by college, not by degree program.

Hopefully, Congress will force a little more accountability on both types of institution.

Theology and Anti-Theology

Christopher hitchensLots of talk about Atheists, Christians and bigotry on the web this week. I have no idea what week that was, this post sat in draft form for a LONG time.

Christopher Hitchens over on Slate discusses what he finds lacking in Rick Warren's theology, and finds it bigotry that there might actually be entrance requirements to the Christian heaven, requirements that include, oh, before you die, agreeing to go there.

However, if the speaker says that heaven is a real place but that you will not get there if you are Jewish, or that Mormonism is a cult and a false religion but that other churches and faiths are the genuine article, then you know that the bigot has spoken.

The basic problem with this is that it starts off with the assumption that all religions are equally right or wrong. This is not a given, if there exists a God, Allah or JHVH.
Heather MacDonald over on Secular Right replies to Hitchens that there is another possibility rather than his idea that Christians are evil bigots.

Either believers live with an extraordinary degree of cognitive dissonance between the inclusive values of their society and the dictates of their religion, or they unconsciously mitigate those bloody-minded dictates as atavistic vestiges from a more primitive time.

Here's my reply:

There is something my pastor once said, that sticks with me when dealing with massively sad things like natural disasters, and applies equally well to the question of who will or will not go to Hell.
“I’m not the Christ.”
I don’t have to bear the sorrows of the entire world on my own shoulders. I don’t have to be responsible for everyone making the right decisions and everything coming out all right. I don’t have to bear that cross.
That’s God’s place.
This knowledge is not incompatible with free will and an existing Hell where all those who do not accept the supremacy of God will go. And, while I can do my best to help illuminate the darkness, I am not the light, and if someone chooses to live in the dark, I can be sad for them without being responsible.
Mr Hitchens and Ms MacDonald both should understand that.

Elsewhere, Tony Woodleif on the Wall Street Journal refutes uber-atheist Richard Dawkins' belief that letting a child believe in Santa Claus or other magic is harmful.

Sexual Jealousy Vs Sex Discrimination

Over on Justia, columnist Joanna L. Grossman has written about what she calls an "Absurd Decision on Sexual Jealousy and Employment". It appears to me, on the other hand, to be a direct reading of the laws involved against the facts involved in the case. Dr. Grossman appears to be one of those free-thinking legal minds who believes that an injured plaintiff should win even when they sue for the wrong thing.

On the other hand, Martha Zackin over at jdsupra gets her analysis right on the dot, ending with this quote -

Nevertheless, based both on precedent and the underlying purpose of anti-discrimination laws, the Court properly found that the law does not protect an employee from unfair decisions or romantic jealousy.

Richard Tuschman at jdsupra says roughly the same thing.

So, now I'll tear into Dr. Grossman's "case". Her conclusions of fact and law rather easily demonstrate her legal sloppiness and bias, and her failure to address the actual law and precedents, rather than her own preferences. I'm not sure whether she actually reviewed any of the court records and discovery documents to come to her conclusions, or whether she even bothered to read the whole ruling itself.

First, Grossman tells us that

"According to the available evidence, the in-person comments and texts of a sexual nature seemed to emanate exclusively from Dr. Knight."

Then, in the next paragraph, Grossman says this -

A comment by Nelson about infrequency in her sex life met with this retort from Knight: “That’s like having a Lamborghini in the garage and never driving it.”

Ummm. So Nelson allegedly telling Knight about infrequency in her sex life was not a comment of a sexual nature? Really? If Grossman wasn't trying to destroy her own credibility, she's managed to give it a pretty good ding getting it out of the garage.

Later, Grossman says this -

The question under Title VII—and the analogous Iowa statute under which this claim was brought—is whether Nelson was fired “because of sex.” Under the statutes the question then, is this: Would Nelson have been fired if she were a man? The answer is clearly no. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the court made a series of logical and doctrinal missteps, which I will describe below.

No, Dr. Grossman, that was not the question. That was Nelson's primary argument, on her sole count against Knight, and that argument went down in flames under years of precedents, properly read and presented by the defendant. If you would read the entire ruling, you'll see what the proper question might have been. But even adjusting your erroneous question any of several ways shows that you are wrong on both the facts and the law.

If Nelson was an attractive man, to whom Dr Knight was terribly attracted, would he/she have been fired? Yes. (Oh,and by the way, you haven't explained where you got your stereotypical idea that Dr Knight is only attracted to women. That claim does not appear to have been made or stipulated by either side in the case, nor was it decided by the Court itself in the ruling.)

If Nelson had been an unattractive woman, to whom Dr Knight was not attracted, would she have been fired? No.

If Nelson had been an attractive woman, whom Dr Knight's wife did not perceive as a threat to the marriage, would she have been fired? No.

The answer is thus clearly that Nelson was not fired because of her sex, but because of her attractiveness to Dr Knight, and more importantly, due to the personal feeling of Ms Knight that Nelson was a potential threat to the marriage.

This is not discrimination on account of sex, read per the statutory language or the tons of case law that the Court did not and cannot blithely ignore, because they are jurists, not columnists.

Notice, I'm not claiming (nor did the Court) that Knight's termination of Nelson was right or fair or even nonactionable under some other theory. It just happens to be a legal fact in the state of Iowa that firing a person because you are attracted to her and your wife is jealous is not "discrimination on account of sex."

The money quote in the Nelson V Knight Dec 21st 2012 ruling is this -

Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act are not general fairness laws, and an employer does not violate them by treating an employee unfairly so long as the employer does not engage in discrimination based upon the employee’s protected status.

Ms Grossman, if you'd like to act like a legal professional and address the actual statutes and precedents and show why the court's analysis is in error, then I'd love to read it. You can start by showing where the Court is wrong in their long discussions and application of Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co 446 F.3d 903, 905–06 (8th Cir. 2006) and of Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902, 903–05 (11th Cir. 1990). Of course, that would mean you would have to achieve what Nelson's attorneys did not.

Again, here's the Court on Dec 21

Significantly, although Dr. Knight discusses Platner at some length in his briefing, Nelson does not refer to the decision in her briefing or attempt to distinguish it.

In other words, Nelson's trial and appeal lawyers, just like Dr. Grossman, blithely ignored the relevant laws and precedents involved, didn't do their homework on this specific case in this jurisdiction with these facts against these statutes and these precedents, and didn't argue their case (the word is "distinguish") sufficiently to win. That's what legal professionals call "a losing strategy".

Grossman is correct where she later notes that the facts of the case are more akin to a sexual harassment case than a sex discrimination case. Which is exactly why the Ohio Supreme Court ruled 7-0 against the plaintiff in this case on these facts regarding this law. Nelson brought her case under the wrong law and the wrong theory of that law. Which is exactly how you lose a case.

When the defendant is guilty of stealing a car, you don't charge them with stealing an airplane. That type of case won't fly!

So, the take-home message is, if you want to win a civil case, don't hire a columnist and "Distinguished Professor of Family Law" like Dr. Grossman, hire a working plaintiff's attorney. And when your attorney files your case, make sure for yourself that they have filed under every possible cause and every possible theory of damages, and ask for even your resume photocopy and Kleenex(tm) tissues and job-search expenses as damages, because they might, under some reading of the facts and some law, make the difference in whether you finally prevail.

Your Right to Sell Your Stuff, Day Four

So, if common sense and the statutory construction is so obviously in his favor, why does Kirtsaeng keep losing? Well, it could have something to do with something that was printed on the books.

This book . . . may not be exported. Exportation from or importation of this book to another region without the Publisher's authorization is illegal and is a violation of the Publisher's rights. The Publisher may take legal action to enforce its rights. The Publisher may recover damages and costs, including but not limited to lost profits and attorney's fees, in the event legal action is required.

So, the question is, can you assign a partial copyright approval, such as the above, to a particular copy of a work?

Why, or why not?

Most of the arguments made in the briefs for either side ignore this specific factual item - that there is a clear copyright statement on the book that disallows import out of Asia or into the United States.

For example, the brief by the American Library Association predicts dire consequences by assuming that the rights explicitly claimed by John Wiley & Sons on the printed copies imported by Kirtsaeng would automatically become retroactive and enforceable on copies of works that do not include any such copyright statements, and even those works that predate the enactment of the law!

No, the sky isn't falling. But the Supreme Court has a difficult task. Can they allow the publisher to win, without creating an incentive for manufacturers and other copyright holders to move manufacturing offshore? Can they let Kirtsaeng win, despite the fact that the copies he imported were clearly not intended for import into the US without the express permission of the publisher?

I would hope for the Supreme Court Justices to craft a reasonable and middle of the road opinion, perhaps allowing the publisher to win narrowly on the precise facts of this case, while brushing back all the lower court opinions that pose the interpretation as a general rule.

Another option for a splitting-the-baby would be to state that the import language printed on the book is not strict enough. How would a U.S. buyer of a legally imported book ever know whether the copy he has is legally imported or not? I'd like to see an opinion that says that if a copy of a work is not legal for import to the US, that copy must clearly state that it is not legal for import to the US. That avoids most of the is-it-or-isn't-it problems, and puts the onus on the copyright holder to give fair warning that the one particular copy in question is established to be illegal to have.

Now, let's see what the Supremes do.

Your Right to Re-Sell Your Stuff, Day Three

Here's an analysis from Harvard about the case, and also see the comments here at drudge.

And here's mine.

THE LEGAL ISSUE

What's at stake here is basically a question of which of two laws takes precedence. One law - Section 109(a), referred to as "first sale" - says that a copyright holder gets to be paid only once for each copy of their thing that gets lawfully made and sold. The second law - Section 602(a)1, "the right to import and distribute" - says that it's illegal for someone else to import into the US a copy of their thing if the copy wasn't lawfully made "under this Title".

The crux is whether, under the specific wording of the second law, a copy of their thing that was made legally under a foreign licensing agreement, and that they have been fully paid for under that agreement, counts as "lawfully made under this Title."

In other words, this is a bread-and-butter "statutory construction" case. The Supreme Court isn't going to go all Roe V Wade and invent "emanations" and "umbras" and "penumbras", they are just going to make a best guess at what Congress meant when they wrote the two statutes.

The American Bar Association [possibly seeing a lucrative new field of lawsuits forming] sides with the publishers and various IP creators and owners (authors, media companies, etc) in claiming that when a publisher produces a book under license in a foreign country, collects a royalty there, and sells that book to the foreign public, that this sale should not count as "lawfully made" under U.S. copyright law.

The American Library Association, ebay, the Internet Commerce Coalition, and various retailers all side with Kirtsaeng, basically under the argument that once a licensed copy of something is manufactured legally somewhere, pursuant to a valid copyright agreement with the US copyright holder, the copyright holder has gotten their one-time royalty, and has no right to control the final product further.

As I read the briefs, it looks like Kirtsaeng's side has the better argument on the statutory language.

With regard to policy, the publisher is arguing for a new definition to support their desired policy - their "right" to license things under different terms in different places, and to keep the legally sold copies, lawfully owned by someone else, from traveling from those different places to each other. This new "right" was clearly not a consideration in the statutory construction at issue in the case. In fact, Congress was busily removing (via sunset) language regarding the location of manufacture.

In addition, applying this new definition of "lawfully made under this title" that is being urged by the publisher to the rest of the places where the same term is used, results in negating some of the clear purposes of the law. For instance, section 109(e) gives the owner of a video game machine which was "lawfully made under this title" the right to publicly "perform or display" the machine. Since the relevant machines were then manufactured in Japan, section 109(e) would have had no effect under the definition that the publisher and the ABA now claim was intended.

So, by the plain normal reading of the text and the history of the two laws, Kirtsaeng should win. So why hasn't he in the lower courts? That's for Day Four.

Right to sell your stuff, Day Two

Okay, so how would the facts have to be for Kirtsaeng to win, lose or draw on his defense of the infringement suit, in the trial court?

CASE ONE - Best facts for the defendant

Let's suppose the facts were like this -

1. the foreign version of the book is physically indistinguishable from the domestic one.
2. The marketer bought his books through intermediaries in the foreign country.
3. The printer had no idea where the books were going.
4. The marketer stated in his ebay ads that the book was pre-owed but never read.

Given facts like these, K should have won hands-down on all counts. He would have received the books legally, through distribution channels that had no legal or contractual restrictions, and would have sold them truthfully.

Given facts like these, the case should have been dismissed with prejudice.

It wasn't, though.

CASE TWO - Bad facts for both sides

On the other hand, suppose the facts are something like this -

• The foreign book has slightly different content.
• The foreign version of the book contains a notation that it is for use in a specific region.
• The foreign printer had no idea where the books were going.
• The marketer claimed in his ebay ads that it was a "new" book.
• The marketer failed to disclose the differences in content or any possible legal restrictions on the book.

Given those facts, K has clearly violated some laws and or torts - primarily fraud against the students in promising one thing and delivering another.

The publisher should win a lawsuit based upon unfair competition, though, not on "copyright infringement."

That didn't happen, though.

CASE THREE - Best facts for the plaintiff

Now, let's look at a third possibility - let's say the facts look something like this -

• The foreign printer had a distribution license clearly limited to a particular region, not including the US.
• The foreign printer knew that the marketer intended to ship the books to the US.
• The marketer knew that the printer was limited to narrow geographical distribution, not including the US.

In that case, the printer and the marketer would have knowingly conspired to breach the printer's contract allowing use of the copyrighted work.

THAT is a copyright violation.

But those aren't the facts either.

THE CASE AS REPORTED

• The book is slightly different, and clearly marked.
• K bought the books through family and friends.
• The foreign printer is not involved in the case.
• No mention is made in the case of any false marketing claims.

Given the above facts, it would appear impossible for K to have violated any copyright laws. He didn't print anything, bought the books legally, had no contractual privity to the publisher, and had no duty not to compete with the publisher or not to resell the books. He bought legally produced copies of a work ion one place and sold them elsewhere.

So why did the plaintiff win against K in the lower courts? Because of one additional fact -

• The foreign edition books are clearly marked as not legal for export outside the region of their publication.

And there's the rub. Can the words printed on an authorized copy of a book create a legal restriction on a subsequent owner? If not, why not? If so, to what degree? More analysis on Day Three.